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Abstract
This essay raises a number of theses in support for a more liberalised approach to EU 
Net Neutrality rules. It offers a graded system of levels of regulatory intervention, 
arguing that soft Net Neutrality rules are capable of meeting all positive objectives 
of regulation without causing the problems generated by hard Net Neutrality rules, 
such as those currently in place in the EU. Hard Net Neutrality rules prevent 
Internet Service Providers (ISPs) from making disruptive innovations. Meanwhile, 
they enable some Content and Application Providers (CAPs) to monopolise many 
markets via (disruptive) innovations, resulting in newly established dominant 
positions which have, in many instances, been abused. The hypothesis of the essay 
is that loosening the rules on Net Neutrality would create competition between ISPs 
and CAPs as well as (which is even more important) between different CAPs for 
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limited premium speed traffic. Such newly established competition could remedy 
some antitrust conundrums faced by EU competition enforcers and sectorial 
regulators vis-à-vis disruptive innovators in the area of electronic communications.
Resume
Cet article soulève un certain nombre de thèses en faveur d’une approche plus 
libéralisée aux règles de l’UE concernant la neutralité du Net. Il offre un système 
progressif de niveaux d’intervention réglementaire, affirmant que des règles non 
contraignantes de la neutralité du Net sont en mesure de répondre à tous les 
objectifs positifs de la réglementation sans causer les problèmes engendrés par 
les règles contraignantes, telles que celles actuellement en vigueur dans l’UE. Les 
règles contraignantes de la neutralité du Net empêchent les fournisseurs de services 
Internet de développer des innovations perturbatrices. Dans le même temps, ils 
permettent à certains fournisseurs de contenus et d’applications de monopoliser 
nombreux marchés via des innovations (perturbatrices), donnant ainsi lieu à des 
nouvelles positions dominantes, qui ont souvent fait l’objet d’abus. L’hypothèse de 
l’article est que desserrant les règles sur la neutralité du Net créerait la concurrence 
entre les fournisseurs de services Internet et les fournisseurs des contenus et 
d’applications, ainsi que (ce qui est encore plus important) entre les différents 
fournisseurs des contenus et d’applications pour le trafic de vitesse limitée 
premium. Cette concurrence nouvellement établie pourrait remédier à certains 
problèmes de concurrence soulevés par les autorités de la concurrence de l’UE et 
les régulateurs sectoriels vis-à-vis des innovateurs perturbateurs dans le domaine 
des communications électroniques.
Key words: Disruptive innovation; electronic communication; Net Neutrality; Net 
Prioritisation; EU Competition Law; sector specific regulation and other ex-ante 
regulatory tools; Internet Service Providers (ISPs) vs. Content and Application 
Providers (CAPs); proactive competition policy.
JEL: K21
I. Introduction
It would be hard to find opponents of Net Neutrality when taken in its 
broadest political sense. Indeed, who would argue against universal access 
to the Internet; information qua fundamental societal value; or the idea that 
everyone should have the opportunity to communicate with a global audience? 
The rhetoric of Net Neutrality, its conversion into a political manifesto of 
‘digital liberty’, into an existential precondition of the Internet as such, has 
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created a caricaturised image of the discussion, a dichotomised conception 
of ‘good guys’ and ‘bad guys’: Progress, Openness, and Inclusiveness vs. 
Conservatism, Narrow-mindedness, and Selfishness. The power of the 
slogan of Net Neutrality can perhaps be easily compared with the rhetorical 
omnipotence of another polysemic term ‘consumer welfare’. Due not least 
to this effective conversion of what is primarily an economic interest into 
the language of political activism, human rights and public interests, the 
proponents of Net Neutrality have succeeded in transposing its key principles 
and premises into sector specific regulations on both sides of the Atlantics. 
However, shifted from the domain of political activism to economic reality, 
the issue of Net Neutrality immediately becomes much more nuanced with 
both parties to this debate having their stronger and weaker sides. Some of 
them will be addressed in this essay.
An intense discussion on Net Neutrality is often connected with another 
topical regulatory issue in the area of information technology: disruptive 
innovation. Both themes and both policies are usually seen as being mutually 
supportive: Net Neutrality encourages disruptive innovation, enabling risky 
and innovative newcomers to outperform incumbents, and this process in 
turn contributes to further strengthening of the idea of Net Neutrality. This 
essay does not share such a view. Or rather, it argues that this is only part 
of the story. The other side of the story has two key components: first, it 
claims that hard Net Neutrality rules distort disruptive innovations on the 
telecom side of the business; second, some of these disruptive innovations 
cause concern for European antitrust regulators. It is thus unclear, why such 
innovators should continue to receive such preferential treatment from the 
regulators, getting, essentially, absolute protection from competition coming 
from telecoms. The essay puts forward and develops several hypotheses, which 
seek to decompose this illusory synergy between Net Neutrality and disruptive 
innovation, arguing that loosening the rules on Net Neutrality, and giving 
Internet Service Providers (hereinafter; ISPs) more flexibility with traffic 
management, would strengthen inter-/ and intra-sectorial competition, which 
would benefit consumers, industrial growth and disruptive innovation itself.
This paper raises a rather provocative question: whether (and if so, then 
to what extent) the current regulatory perplexity, with which European 
authorities approach competition-related problems associated with disruptive 
technologies in the area of the Internet, has been created or at least facilitated 
by Net Neutrality regulation. Or perhaps less controversially: can softening the 
rules on Net Neutrality counterbalance the current situation by facilitating an 
emergence of disruptive innovators on the side of Internet Service Providers? 
If the answer to this question is affirmative, then it is possible to ask another, 
more important, question. Namely, whether the current dominance of 
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disruptive innovators on the content side of the market could be challenged 
by the market’s invisible hand; and whether ISPs could be encouraged by 
proactive sector specific regulation to launch/reinforce competition in this 
sector by triggering their key tool: traffic speed gradation.
The assumption supporting this essay is quite straightforward: if one of the 
key challenges of contemporary competition policy1 is in designing effective 
regulatory tools capable of addressing the unprecedented growth in dominance 
of disruptive technologies in the Internet, then a solution could possibly be 
offered by the leading competing industry: telecoms. Alternatively, at least 
that regulators should intervene in the organic competitive process between 
content and application providers (hereinafter; CAPs) on one side and ISPs 
on the other only with a particular delicacy; intervene only in a manner, not 
giving explicit priority to one industry over another, let alone prohibiting ISPs 
from taking part in disruptive innovation outright through the imposition of 
hard Net Neutrality rules.
An important caveat should be entered at the very outset. This essay does 
not advocate the view that the principle of Net Neutrality is wrong in itself 
or that the opposing approach – Net Prioritisation – is a panacea for the 
problems associated with antitrust regulation of disruptive technologies in 
the area of the Internet. The argument is much more modest and nuanced 
and it is primarily apagogical. I argue that the very nature of disruptive 
innovation is based on the notion of unpredictability; that it is usually created 
in a competitive environment similar to Hayek’s ‘competition qua discovery 
procedure’, which is inherently driven by Smith’s idea of ‘the invisible hand’. 
Because disruptive innovation is by definition unpredictable and because it 
is driven by markets’ ‘spontaneous order’, all/many/some of its shortcomings, 
which currently puzzle most antitrust regulators, should be left for the markets’ 
self-correction. Instead of adopting this approach, regulators in the EU and 
US have chosen a completely different route, giving categorical priority to 
one industry (CAPs) over the other (ISPs), wrongly believing that disruptive 
innovation streams exclusively from the former, considering the latter as merely 
a ‘dumb pipe’. Regulatory bonuses such as Net Neutrality, have given priority 
to the CAPs, many of whom have used it successfully to become disruptive 
innovators and gain positions of super-dominance in their relevant markets. 
In other words, regulators’ unprecedented benevolence to one industry at the 
cost of the other has contributed substantially to the emergence of a situation 
wherein many disruptive innovators have themselves become a headache to 
antitrust authorities. Potential ISPs competitors, who could be expected to 
1 I use the term ‘competition policy’ broadly, implying traditional reactionary tools such 
as antitrust as well as more proactive mechanisms like mergers and ex ante sector specific 
regulation.
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counterbalance such super-dominance by using the mechanism of market 
forces, have been effectively disabled from these attempts by de iure or de 
facto prohibition of Net Prioritisation. Net Prioritisation is in itself an effective 
tool of competition, which could rearrange the whole architecture of Internet 
commerce – a particularly powerful proposition in a time of growing synergy 
and hybridisation of ISPs and CAPs across the Internet.
II. Scale of regulatory intervention
The variety of regulatory options can be visualised as a line with gradual 
levels of regulatory interference, where Level 0 is the most liberal and 
Level 6+ is the most paternalistic. Current EU rules on Net Neutrality are 
set on Level 5B. The essay argues that they have to be moved up to Level 5A.2
Level 0 – being a genuine laissez-faire (hands off) approach with full reliance 
on the Schumpeterian process of creative destruction;
Level 1 – laissez-faire + contract law and public security;
Level 2 – adding also ex post antitrust rules;
Level 3 – adding also ex ante merger control;
Level 4 – adding also ex ante sector specific regulation prohibiting 
discrimination, throttling and other forms of traffic downgrade (soft Net 
Neutrality rules and respective rejection of hard Net Prioritisation rules);
Level 5 – adding also a prohibition of any type of traffic prioritisation 
(hard Net Neutrality rules and respective rejection of both hard and soft Net 
Prioritisation rules);
Level 6 and Level 6+ – various types of dirigisme or planned/command 
economy.
This essay explicitly differentiates between two types of conduct, which hard 
Net Neutrality rules respectively prohibit: reactionary and proactive.
The former (reactionary) is in general a counterproductive reaction on the 
part of ISPs to various disruptive initiatives launching by CAPs. The reaction 
is related mainly to blocking, throttling or discrimination of disruptive 
goods and services which threaten the established business models of the 
incumbents (for example VoIP vs. fixed line). Arguably, these practices could 
be dealt with effectively by such classical ex post antitrust tools as Articles 
101; 102 and 106 TFEU, but ex ante prohibition of such conduct in the form 
of soft Net Neutrality rules (Level 4) does not appear to be particularly 
problematic.
2 Infra.
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The latter (proactive) is a completely different mode of conduct. It refers 
to ISPs’ exploration of (disruptive) business models using traffic prioritisation 
technologies as leverage. Prohibition of such practices is enacted by hard Net 
Neutrality rules (Level 5B). Its aim is not to protect disruptive technologies 
from a hostile reaction of incumbents, but rather to prevent ISPs from engaging 
in disruptive technologies themselves. Criticism of Level 5B regulation is 
the key argument of this paper and so a more detailed elaboration of the 
argument is required.
Conventional wisdom suggests that CAPs should innovate (disruptively) 
in the area of content and application creation and ISPs should be active 
in the sphere of delivering the traffic. In reality, however, the activities of 
both these super-industries are interdependent. Hybridisation of the Internet 
implies direct expansion and interpenetration of CAPs in the area of electronic 
communication and that of ISPs in the sphere of creating or distributing 
content. The links between the two industries are even more obvious, when 
attention is shifted from inter-industry to intra-industry competition, namely 
when the conduct of ISPs influences competition within the CAPs industry 
and vice versa. It is precisely here where one can observe the first fallacy 
of hard Net Neutrality. The fallacy is based on the (wrong) assumption that 
inter-industry competition is more important than intra-industry one. This is 
done in keeping with the dominant view on the subsidiary role of intra-brand 
competition in comparison with the inter-brand one. But competition within 
an industry is an inter-brand competition itself, and thus the ability of ISPs 
to bring new dimensions to this competition is invaluable (though seldom 
explored or even articulated). At this point, another incorrect assumption 
should be deconstructed, namely, the view that all CAPs are united against 
the idea of soft (let alone hard) Net Prioritisation and that they firmly support 
the principles of hard (and of course soft) Net Neutrality. In some sense, 
they do indeed appear to be united but this unity has features surprisingly 
similar to cartel collusion. The introduction of traffic prioritisation would open 
enormous opportunities for inter-brand competition within the CAP industry. 
This competition would lead to new (disruptive) business models, enabling 
CAPs to compete within a completely new area of merit: the speed with 
which their content can be consumed by end-users. This new dimension of 
competition would be capable of rearranging the current state of affairs in the 
CAP business, by definition creating new winners and new losers. But rather 
than exploring these new commercial horizons, which would offer an excellent 
tool to reach new consumers and create new competitive advantages, each 
individual leading CAP has chosen a different path: they united in a proxy-war 
against these technological modifications (and by association against ISPs). 
With the help of human rights activists, political campaigners, industrial lobby 
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groups and catchy slogans, something, which is an inherently commercial issue, 
has been presented to the public as an (ultimate) fight for free Internet. In 
other words, the key stakeholders understood that while a new reality would 
create numerous winners and losers within the CAP industry, the industry 
as a whole would be worse off, as Net Prioritisation would essentially imply 
a transfer of some net revenues generated by CAPs to ISPs.
It would be very difficult (though not impossible) to find arguments in 
support of hard Net Prioritisation (prohibited by Level 4 intervention). Indeed, 
targeted practices of speed downgrading, throttling and similar limitations 
associated with the ‘free riding’ problem, appear to be more disproportional, 
the more defensive and selective they are. Yet the campaigners for Net 
Neutrality succeeded in advocating for much stronger and much broader 
regulation, the regulation, which covers most aspects of soft Net Prioritisation 
(Level 5 intervention).
Another important clarification is necessary at this point: Level 5 intervention 
is not homogeneous either. It implies at least four paradigmatic layers of 
prohibition: layers A, B, C and D.
Layer A intervention is the least controversial – it envisages that ISPs 
would operationalise their traffic management capacity at the expense of 
non-prioritised end users, simply offering higher speed to selected CAPs by 
lowering the speed for all others. However unrealistic this practice appears to 
be (especially in the areas with at least some meaningful competition between 
IPSs), and however anticompetitive it would be from the perspective of ex post 
antitrust (that is a Level 2 intervention), yet its explicit prohibition does not 
raise fundamental objections from most of the ISPs these days.
Layer B, by contrast, is particularly problematic. It implies the reverse 
scenario: most of the traffic remains unmanaged and all end-users receive 
their Internet access at normal speed. Some fraction of the whole traffic (for 
example 5%), however, is allowed to be delivered at a higher speed. This 
premium speed service would be offered to CAPs (not end-users) for a fixed 
charge or percentage of the revenue generated as an outcome of such specific 
contracts between ISPs and CAPs. This mechanism has a potential to rearrange 
the way in which the Internet is consumed, and to reshuffle the strategic roles 
of the key stakeholders in the Internet as business. Leaving aside the political 
rhetoric of Net Neutrality, the motivation of CAPs to prevent this option is 
directed at this very point. So essentially, the economic essence of the Net 
Neutrality movement is centred precisely here. The following part of the essay 
analyses it in more detail. It will explain why shifting the regulatory cursor 
from Level 5B (where it is now) to Level 5A might increase competition, boost 
(disruptive) innovation, contribute to the benefits of consumers (both in terms 
of welfare and choice), and help to address antitrust problems associated with 
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the abusive conduct of many disruptive innovators on the CAP side of the 
business.
Layer C and Layer D are less controversial. They constitute instances, 
in which proponents of soft Net Prioritisation already secured at least 
a partial victory in Europe. Layer C concerns the ability of ISPs to provide 
some priority as regards their own content or content streamed by ISPs (or 
integrated companies) themselves. Layer D leaves room for ISPs to provide 
some prioritisation to such specialised services as telemedicine, driverless cars 
and other highly innovative and highly specialised models. Some of the traffic 
management necessary for the delivery of such services is currently envisaged 
at an EU regulatory level.
III. EU Net Neutrality Rules
The Possible formats of Net Neutrality have been debated in Europe for 
over a decade (Maniadaki, 2015, pp. 35–36; Alexiadis and Cockcroft, 2014). 
On 25 November 2015, EU Telecom Single Market (hereinafter; TSM) 
Regulation was adopted.3 The Body of European Regulators for Electronic 
Communications (BEREC) is required to monitor compliance of individual 
Member States with the requirements of the TSM Regulation.
The TSM Regulation puts forward ‘common rules to safeguard equal and 
non-discriminatory treatment of traffic in the provision of internet access 
services and related end-users rights’ (Article 1). These common rules can be 
subject to some traffic management limitations, related mainly to effective 
technical management of the network.4
3 Regulation (EU) 2015/2120 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 
2015 laying down measures concerning open internet access and amending Directive 2002/22/ EC 
on universal service and users’ rights relating to electronic communications networks and 
services and Regulation (EU) No 531/2012 on roaming on public mobile communications 
networks within the Union (Text with EEA relevance), OJ L 310, 26.11.2015, p. 1–18.
4 Article 3(3) of the TSM Regulation: ‘[ISPs can implement] reasonable traffic management 
measures. In order to be deemed to be reasonable, such measures shall be transparent, 
non-discriminatory and proportionate, and shall not be based on commercial considerations but 
on objectively different technical quality of service requirements of specific categories of traffic.
Such measures shall not monitor the specific content and shall not be maintained for longer 
than necessary. Providers of internet access services shall not engage in traffic management 
measures going beyond those set out in the second subparagraph, and in particular shall 
not block, slow down, alter, restrict, interfere with, degrade or discriminate between specific 
content, applications or services, or specific categories thereof, except as necessary, and only 
for as long as necessary’.
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In other words, the TSM Regulation provides explicit and unequivocal 
support for soft Net Neutrality rules (Level 4),5 but not all elements of hard 
Net Neutrality rules (Level 5) are protected by it. In particular, it explicitly 
reserves the room for Level 5D (specialised services) Net Prioritisation6, 
as well as offering some implicit toleration towards Level 5C services 
(prioritisation of content/application offered by ISPs’ own platforms). It also 
enables reasonable traffic management in the case of public policy exceptions 
related to the integrity and security of the network and the eventual avoidance 
of its congestions. For obvious reasons, these exemptions go beyond the scope 
of this discussion.
But even a creative interpretation of some provisions of the TSM 
Regulation leaves no room for Level 5B of Net Prioritisation – the level, an 
open recognition of which would entail a paradigmatic shift in the business of 
the Internet, and which constitutes the central argument of this essay, which 
advocates for its necessity. Level 5A is protected in full and the essay offers 
no amendment in this respect.
IV. Parallel reality: a business model without Net Neutrality rules
As became obvious in the introduction, this essay does not share the 
popular belief that the Net Neutrality movement is motivated by political 
slogans about Internet democracy and universal access. Distancing ourselves 
from this appealing and viral rhetoric, we can see two very powerful and 
mutually dependent industries: ISPs and CAPs, coming to grips over the 
future architecture of the Internet and over the role each industry will play 
there. They confront each other in a very dynamic time, in which the market 
positions they manage to secure today will define their economic power for 
decades.
5 Recital (11) of the TSM Regulation: ‘Any traffic management practices which go beyond 
such reasonable traffic management measures, by blocking, slowing down, altering, restricting, 
interfering with, degrading or discriminating between specific content, applications or services, 
or specific categories of content, applications or services, should be prohibited.’
6 Article 3(5) of the TSM Regulation: ‘Providers […] shall be free to offer services other than 
internet access services which are optimised for specific content, […] where the optimisation is 
necessary in order to meet requirements of the content, applications or services for a specific 
level of quality. Providers of electronic communications to the public, including providers of 
internet access services, may offer or facilitate such services only if the network capacity is 
sufficient to provide them in addition to any internet access services provided. Such services 
shall not be usable or offered as a replacement for internet access services, and shall not be 
to the detriment of the availability or general quality of internet access services for end-users.’
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Under the current format of the Internet, content from CAPs is delivered 
to end-users by ISPs in, essentially, a non-differentiated way. This implies 
that CAPs compete for end-users between themselves. ISPs do not participate 
in this process. They compete for end-users on quality and price only at the 
users’ last mile. They are not allowed to compete at the end-users first mile. 
Powerful triggers of competition, such as the offer of premium speed traffic 
to selected CAPs, have been artificially removed from the competitive options 
of ISPs by explicit Net Neutrality regulation. This situation is pathological. 
In its stylised form it would be similar to prohibiting restaurants to compete 
with each other using the Google Maps service as it ‘infringes’ ‘Restaurant 
Neutrality’ principles.
Without such rules many ISPs would be able to offer CAPs an option of 
delivering their content to end-users at higher speed, which would obviously 
strengthen the market position of those CAPs in the click-and-watch Internet 
universe. Such a service would not be discriminatory if only a tiny proportion 
(for example 5% of all traffic processed by the ISP) were eligible for such 
differentiation. By analogy, flying with business-class is non-discriminatory 
for the remaining passengers if only a tiny proportion of seats is envisaged 
for this option (it would become discriminatory if a dominant airline would 
sell business class tickets as the default option). Reductio ad Absurdum, higher 
prices, paid by end-users for higher speed at the ‘last mile’ could also have 
some impact on neutrality, but nobody is labelling this as discriminatory. But 
the same optional practice done by CAPs is seen as the utmost evil of the 
Internet.
A counterargument to this scenario would be a hypothesis that premium 
speed would be used only by top CAPs, which would make the gap between 
them and the rest of CAPs even bigger. First of all, the very idea that regulatory 
intervention can be used to shape the exact format of a particular industry 
requires robust justification. The burden of proof is on the proponents of Net 
Neutrality. Second, the premium speed option could be regularly accessed by 
newcomers, which would lower barriers to entry and can be generally seen as 
procompetitive. Third, even if accepting the assumption that premium speed 
will be primarily used by powerful CAPs, they would be mainly using this tool 
in their competition between themselves (and not between them and smaller 
CAPs). This would encourage (disruptive) innovation, increase competition 
and contribute to positive viewer experiences. Fourth, even if the format is 
inaccessible for smaller CAPs, these CAPs would still be able to deliver their 
content at normal (non-premium) speed as is the case with Net Neutrality 
rules. Fifth, the availability of such option would have a positive impact on 
(disruptive) innovation techniques used also by ISPs, as they would transform 
themselves from a ‘dumb pipe’ mission to a proactive Internet industry.
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From the perspective of antitrust enforcers and sector specific regulators 
disruptive innovation is a double-edged sword. On one hand, we all know 
that innovation is an inevitable component of human progress and prosperity, 
that most of our policies are designed to protect and encourage innovation. 
On the other hand, we also know that many disruptive innovators cause 
competition-related problems. Another incarnation of Bork’s antitrust paradox: 
the more powerful/successful the innovator becomes the higher potential he 
gains to harm competition.
In a classical Net Neutrality rhetoric, proactive ISPs are seen as obstacles 
for innovation. The classic rent-seekers vs. free-riders dilemma has been 
solved by regulators in favour of the latter. But the CAPs did not stop at this 
soft Net Neutrality imperative (prohibition of defence against free-riding), 
going further, preventing ISPs from incentives to use their natural competitive 
advantage: traffic speed; to innovate in the area of their specialisation. 
Disruptive innovations in the sector of ISPs have been sacrificed for the 
benefits of disruptive innovations in the sector of CAPs. Enabling ISPs to 
take a more proactive position would boost the hybridisation of platforms and 
means of content delivery.
What appears to be particularly striking is that CAPs criticise soft Net 
Prioritisation rules despite the fact that these rules would enable another 
important element of competition between CAPs themselves, as the ability 
to deliver content to end-users at higher speed is a very appealing marketing 
tool and a very powerful factor in designing new commercial models to 
the detriment of competitors and to the benefit of consumers. Surprisingly 
(?), instead of exploiting these options in trying to be the first, CAPs as an 
industry has opted for a radical opposition to such technological improvement, 
using influential lobby groups to shift regulatory attention to the illusionary 
problems of human rights and scaremongering the public with aggressive 
political campaigns for ‘Internet freedom’.
Schematically, such behaviour among CAPs is very similar to the conduct 
of members of cartels, who opt for joining their efforts in achieving benefits 
for the industry as a whole to the detriment of competition between different 
members of the industry. The surprising unity of CAPs in rejecting such 
a powerful instrument of competition within the industry can be explained 
by their coordinated action. Something which is essentially an important 
factor of intra-industry competition between CAPs has been re-interpreted 
by presenting it as a battle between CAP and ISP industries (which is also 
true… half-true).
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V. Conclusion
This essay argues in favour of loosening the regulatory mechanism of Net 
Neutrality from Level 5B to Level 5A (the specific nature of these levels has 
been discussed in Section II of the paper). Soft Net Neutrality (5A) rules 
suffice to protect the CAPs industry from the discriminatory actions of ISPs. 
Hard Net Neutrality (5B and below) rules are too bold and unreserved. 
Hard Net Neutrality discourages ISPs from (disruptive) innovation; prevents 
end-user choice, disallowing access to premium content at premium speed; 
and it infringes competition between CAPs on the grounds of speed with 
which their content is delivered to end-users. Overall, hard Net Neutrality 
rules provide a disproportionally beneficial regulatory environment for one 
industry (CAPs) at the cost of another (ISPs), disentangling the latter’s ability 
to innovate disruptively in a market with very high economic, technological 
and social potential. The essay further provides differentiation of Level 
5 regulatory intervention, explaining that the economic gist of the Net 
Neutrality debate is focused between Layers A and B of Level 5, namely, 
between traffic discrimination vs. traffic prioritisation. Traffic is differentiated 
in a discriminatory way (Layer A) when premium speed is granted to the 
detriment of most of the end-users. Such a practice is correctly prohibited. 
Traffic is differentiated in a  form of prioritisation when only a tiny fraction 
(for example 5%) is offered by ISPs to CAPs at a special rate. Such practice 
does not affect network capacity or the general speed of all end-users, who 
consume the remaining 95% of traffic, as this mode of provision is, in turn, 
primarily an outcome of ISPs’ incentive to invest and innovate, derived from 
their ability to generate additional profits and explore new markets. Premium 
speed charge is offered not to end-users, but to CAPs, which encourages 
competition within this industry.
Even if CAPs passed on some of their additional costs to consumers, they 
would do it in a competitive environment; consumers will always be able to 
opt out of premium speed by simply not downloading the relevant content; 
consumers would get in return ‘premium’ speed; and finally, those CAPs who 
chose this model would be very likely to generate additional profits by gaining 
higher market share. As a result, the necessity of passing any substantial costs 
on to consumers would remain hypothetical rather than real. Even in the worst 
case scenario, these costs would be fractional and incomparably smaller than 
the benefits generated for end-users and society as a whole. Most consumers 
would be unaffected. Most of those affected would be affected positively. 
ISPs would get regulatory permission (sic!) to innovate. Competition within 
the CAP industry for quicker delivery of their content and applications to 
end-users would be incentivised (if not created from scratch) – these are the 
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quite likely consequences of shifting the regulatory cursor from Level 5B to 
Level 5A.
Even a symbolic number as regards prioritised traffic, such as 5%, is capable 
of stimulating ISPs to explore this business model and to trigger competition 
in the CAP industry. This is a sector of the economy that, until recently, has 
been considered by regulators as deserving preferential treatment, and which 
has increasingly demonstrated features surprisingly similar to other industries, 
which competition enforcers and regulatory authorities deal with on a regular 
basis.
The essay is based on a conceptual analysis. The suggested number of 5% is 
taken as a symbol of the necessity to leave at least some room for this business 
model open. If regulators are unhappy with 5%, they can move it to 1% of 
the traffic. Disruptive innovations take place in all spheres of human activity. 
The law is not immune to this process. Allocating even a tiny regulatory space 
for this model could test its feasibility and effectiveness. The scope can always 
be managed by regulators accordingly. What is important is not to abandon 
this business model outright. Such a complete prohibition of Level 5B is 
disproportional, unjustified and based only on successful policy activism on the 
part of this complex side, the part (however innovative it appears to be), which 
in this particular instance has chosen to sacrifice competition for stability, 
a choice in itself very suspicious from the perspective of competition law and 
policy. If it succeeds, this model could also remedy some of the antitrust 
related problems in the area of CAP as it would create new challenges for 
most of the dominant CAPs. Furthermore, this remedy would be generated by 
genuine market forces streaming from a different industry, in essence, allowing 
the market to correct regulatory errors.
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